Iran War Complicates the Summit as Trump Seeks Beijing’s Diplomatic Leverage
Beyond trade and technology, the ongoing U.S. war in Iran looms over every dimension of the Beijing talks. Trump entered office in 2025 with hawkish rhetoric toward Tehran, and the conflict that followed has extracted a significant political cost. Approval ratings for the president have been badly dented by the war, and rising inflation — partly attributed by analysts to energy market disruptions caused by Persian Gulf tensions — has elevated the risk that Republicans lose control of one or both chambers of Congress in November’s midterm elections.
Trump is expected to ask Xi to use China’s influence over Iran to push Tehran toward a negotiated settlement with Washington. The United States and Iran have long maintained an adversarial relationship, and Beijing, as a significant buyer of Iranian oil and a strategic partner to Tehran, holds considerable sway — at least in theory. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking to Fox News aboard Air Force One, made the economic case for Chinese intervention, arguing that Chinese cargo vessels are among those stranded in the Persian Gulf and that any broader slowdown in global trade triggered by the conflict would directly harm China’s export-dependent economy.
Analysts, however, are skeptical that Xi will be willing or able to deliver on such an ask. Iran serves Beijing as a strategic counterweight to American influence in the Middle East, and any public pressure from China on Tehran risks undermining that relationship. Several foreign policy observers have noted that China’s interest in resolving the conflict is real but limited — and that Beijing may prefer a prolonged stalemate that keeps Washington occupied and distracted rather than a swift resolution that frees American attention and resources for the Indo-Pacific.
Taiwan Arms Sales Emerge as a Central Flashpoint in U.S.-China Diplomatic Talks
For Beijing, one issue eclipses all others: the status of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the self-governed democratic island that China claims as its sovereign territory. The Chinese government reiterated on Wednesday — the day before the summit — its strong opposition to a $14 billion military assistance package currently awaiting President Trump’s approval, reaffirming that it “is ready to crush any Taiwan independence bid.” The statement underscored how fundamentally the Taiwan question continues to define the ceiling of what is achievable in any U.S.-China diplomatic engagement.
U.S. law formally obligates Washington to provide Taiwan with the defensive arms it needs to protect itself, even in the absence of formal diplomatic relations with Taipei. That legal structure means Trump cannot simply set aside the arms sale as a concession to Beijing without triggering domestic legal and political backlash. Analysts in Taipei, however, are watching to see whether the pending package is further delayed, altered, or quietly shelved as part of informal diplomatic quid pro quos that never appear in official readouts.
“I don’t think that Trump is going to just let Beijing basically ask for whatever they want and then the U.S. will make any concession that Beijing requests.”— Ronan Fu, Assistant Research Fellow, Academia Sinica (Taiwan)
Trump’s Weakened Negotiating Position Shapes the Outcome of U.S.-China Diplomacy
Multiple structural factors have eroded Trump’s leverage heading into Beijing. U.S. federal courts have issued rulings limiting the president’s unilateral authority to impose tariffs on exports from China and other trading partners — a constraint that removes one of the most potent tools in the administration’s economic arsenal. The ongoing Iran conflict has elevated domestic inflation and created political exposure for the Republican Party ahead of November’s midterm elections, in which control of the House and Senate may hinge partly on voter sentiment about economic conditions and the war’s conduct.
While the Chinese economy has its own well-documented challenges — including a property sector crisis, sluggish consumer demand, and deflationary pressures — Xi faces no comparable domestic political constraint. The Chinese Communist Party’s consolidated control over the state apparatus means Xi can take a long-term view of negotiations without fear of electoral consequence. That asymmetry, analysts argue, structurally advantages Beijing in any summit where short-term deliverables are expected.
The presence of high-profile U.S. corporate executives on the delegation may partially offset some of that asymmetry. Companies like Nvidia and Tesla have significant business interests at stake in China, and their participation sends a signal that the American private sector has a concrete economic stake in improved bilateral relations — a dynamic that could give Trump additional domestic political support for any concessions he reaches with Xi. Xi has a reciprocal visit to the United States tentatively scheduled for later in 2026 — his first trip to American soil since Trump returned to power. The outcome of this week’s meetings in Beijing will in large part determine the political conditions under which that visit can occur.
Frequently Asked Questions About the Trump-Xi Beijing Summit
The Trump-Xi Beijing summit arrives at a moment when the foundations of the post-Cold War international order are under visible strain — with a U.S.-Iran war reshaping energy markets and regional alliances, a bilateral trade truce as fragile as it is consequential, and a technology rivalry over semiconductors and artificial intelligence that neither side shows any sign of backing away from. Whatever agreements emerge from the Great Hall of the People this week will be stress-tested almost immediately by the domestic political pressures bearing down on both leaders: Trump by an electorate restive over inflation and a costly foreign war, Xi by an economy that continues to underperform its potential. For now, the very fact that these two leaders are sitting across from each other — in Beijing, at the Temple of Heaven, over state banquets and private lunches — signals that however adversarial the relationship has become, neither Washington nor Beijing has concluded it is better managed through confrontation alone.
